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Abstract: The implementation of Vermont’s state health exchange has been at the 
forefront of political debate in the Green Mountain State since the passage of Act No. 48 
in 2011. This paper addresses the ways in which federal legislation under the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA), spurred the development of Vermont’s own state-based exchange. It 
identifies the objectives that policymakers put forth during development and assesses 
whether or not these goals have been met. The paper offers insight into the future 
prospects of Vermont Health Connect (VHC) under both new gubernatorial and 
presidential administrations. In addition to secondary source research, this analysis draws 
on informational interviews conducted with leading health care reform policymakers in 
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Vermont Health Connect (VHC) is the online portal to Vermont’s health 
insurance marketplace. The exchange was developed in 2011 in response to the passage 
of the federal Affordable Care Act (ACA), and its implementation has been wrought with 
controversy. VHC’s website paints a positive picture of the exchange, declaring that 
VHC is “for Vermonters, by Vermonters,” and that it constitutes “one more step toward 
access to comprehensive health coverage for all Vermonters.”1 Nationally, experts 
praised the development of the exchange, stating “although Vermont is a small state, its 
reform efforts provide valuable lessons for other states in implementing ACA reforms.”2 
In contrast, during the 2016 gubernatorial race Vermont’s newly elected Governor, Phil 
Scott, campaigned on the message that Vermont is unaffordable largely because of its 
health care system.3 Scott advocated that “what we have right now is fully dysfunctional. 
. . . it’s not working, so we need to transition to something else.”4 Additionally, 
information technology problems associated with the exchange’s rollout led to a 
customer service backlog that peaked at over 10,000 cases and sparked a media 
firestorm.5 This controversy surrounding Vermont’s health exchange has been playing 
out in the Green Mountain State over the past six years. This paper seeks to address the 
question of whether or not VHC has indeed been successful in meeting policy objectives 
and to contribute to the body of analytical literature on this subject. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 "About Vermont Health Connect," Vermont Health Connect, accessed May 1, 2017, 
2 Laura K. Grubb, "Lessons from Vermont's Health Care Reform," New England Journal 
of Medecine, no. 368 (April 4, 2013). 
3 Peter Hirschfeld, "Scott Says It's Time To Abandon Vermont Health Connect," Vermont 
Public Radio, accessed May 1, 2017, http://digital.vpr.net/post/scott-says-its-time-
abandon-vermont-health-connect#stream/0. 
4 Ibid. 
5 "2015 SMART Report: Executive Summary," Vermont Health Connect, (Vermont 
Agency of Human Services, Montpelier, VT, 2015). 
	   4	  
The paper first describes the research approach, including a personal disclaimer 
regarding my preconceived view of VHC and the process by which I conducted 
interviews with leading health care reform policymakers in Vermont. It then gives a 
review of the literature relevant to an analysis of Vermont’s health care exchange. The 
paper discusses the ACA’s provisions for state exchanges broadly before focusing on 
what they mean for states themselves and the context of health care reform in Vermont, 
with particular regard to the passage of Act No. 48. An act relating to a universal and 
unified health system. It offers an answer to the question of why Vermont opted to build 
its own exchange by outlining three policy objectives, and then presents an analysis of 
how well VHC has fulfilled those policy goals. This thesis does not analyze whether 
these health care objectives are good or bad, but merely assesses whether or not they have 
been met. Finally, the paper considers the current climate regarding VHC and offers 
insight about the next steps for policymakers in Vermont. Please note that this paper also 
includes two appendices: Appendix 1 details the interview parameters utilized in my 
research; and Appendix 2 comments on Act 48’s other initiatives and what those 
developments mean for health care reform in Vermont.  
There is a void in academic literature when it comes to the evaluation of VHC as 
a specific case. Countless news articles and media stories express consumer frustration 
with VHC and reports issued by the Green Mountain Care Board (GMCB) or Governor’s 
Office of Health Care Reform outline the exchange’s technological developments, 
qualified health plans, and effects on the uninsured rate. Yet, an analysis of how the 
implications of VHC measure up to the policy’s initial objectives is absent from the mix. 
This study addresses the intent and objectives of Vermont’s state exchange and analyzes 
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whether or not those goals have been carried out; thus, it represents a new contribution to 
the body of work that currently exists on this topic. Furthermore, this paper’s analysis of 
VHC is timely in that it takes place in the wake of the 2016 election, amidst a period of 
transition for both Vermont’s gubernatorial administration and the presidential 
administration, when new political actors and agendas have the potential to create 
significant change in the health care arena.  
Research Approach and Relevant Literature 
This project was inspired by an undergraduate internship experience in the 
Vermont Governor’s Office. In the summer of 2014, I worked as a Constituent Services 
Intern in the Office of Governor Peter Shumlin. One of my primary tasks during this time 
was to answer the Governor’s publicly accessible hotline. Constituents can call this line 
in order to speak with a staff person in the office and express an opinion regarding an 
issue or seek and be directed to state resources and services for various needs. I estimate 
that more than half of the calls and correspondence that I handled during this period 
related to VHC and these instances fell under both of the aforementioned categories. My 
internship experience left me wanting to understand further the complexities of health 
care reform in Vermont and why so many people appeared to be dissatisfied with the 
exchange. I left the Governor’s office with an impression similar to the one that I think 
that many Vermonters hold regarding VHC. I was frustrated that I received such a high 
volume of calls from constituents having difficulty with the exchange, when it was 
supposed to be something that improved their health care situation. Three years later I 
began a yearlong research project with a preconceived bias against the exchange, hoping 
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to better understand the policy; I ended the project with a drastically different 
perspective. 
Methodology and Interviews 
 This paper is comprised of four principle research components. First, I assess the 
provisions and consequences of the ACA as they pertain to state exchanges using 
academic literature. Second, I identify the policy objectives of VHC through an 
examination of the actual legislation passed by the Vermont General Assembly. Next, I 
use reports commissioned by the Legislature and authored by stakeholders in Vermont 
health care policy to analyze VHC’s fulfillment of the identified policy objectives. 
Finally, I maintain and augment the conclusions drawn from primary and secondary 
sources using evidence gathered in a series of informational interviews. 
For this project, I interviewed three health care reform policy advisors who 
worked in the Shumlin administration: Michael Costa; Robin Lunge; and Lawrence 
Miller. Michael Costa served as the Deputy Director of Health Care Reform under 
Governor Shumlin and in the Scott administration serves as the Deputy Commissioner of 
Health Services and Managed Care at the Department of Vermont Health Access. Robin 
Lunge was the Director of Health Care Reform under Governor Shumlin and currently 
serves as a member of the Green Mountain Care Board (GMCB). Lawrence Miller 
worked as the Chief of Health Care Reform in the Shumlin administration. All of the 
interviewees were appointed by Peter Shumlin and held a favorable view of his 
administration’s health care reform efforts. This is to be expected as one of the roles of 
the Governor is to appoint policymakers and Governor Shumlin was in office at the time 
of Act 48’s passage and throughout the development of VHC until January 2017. Each 
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interviewee’s specific policymaking role gives authority to the material collected during 
the interviews and so their responses are attributed in the text. Discussions varied in 
length from 30-90 minutes. For more information about the interview procedures, see 
Appendix 1. 
Relevant Literature 
 A large body of academic literature exists on the topic of the ACA itself, and 
although a relatively significant amount has been written on the subject of state 
exchanges, there lacks literature pertaining to the specific and trying circumstances of 
VHC. For the purposes of this thesis, the academic literature falls into three categories. 
There is a body of literature that broadly addresses the development of the ACA and the 
arena of health care reform in the United States overall. A number of works assess the 
implications of the ACA for specific populations, and most pertinent to this study, there 
is a series of literature that discusses the ways in which the ACA interacts with state 
exchanges.  
Paul Starr’s book, entitled Remedy and Reaction: The Peculiar American Struggle 
Over Health Care Reform, takes an historical approach in its explanation of the 
complexities of health care reform.6 It addresses the question of why health care is such a 
complicated and intense issue in the United States. This is an especially conspicuous 
question when our country is compared to other world powers. Starr asserts that the 
answer to this question is rooted in historical approaches to the issue. He argues that 
America suffers from both economic and psychological barriers when it comes to health 
care. Also included in this broad first category are works such as John E. McDonough’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Paul Starr, Remedy and Reaction: The Peculiar American Struggle Over Health Care 
Reform (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013). 
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book, Inside National Health Reform, that focus mostly on the ACA and the legislative 
history of the policy issue under President Barack Obama.7 McDonough describes how 
the development takes place over a two-year period, beginning with the 2008 presidential 
campaign and culminating with the signing of the bill in 2010. McDonough is a health 
care policy expert at Harvard and is able to explain in detail the inner workings of the 
legislation itself, alongside the political processes leading to its passage. 
Additionally, there are a number of articles that project or assess the implications 
of the provisions of the ACA for specific populations. Winkelman, HwaJong, and Davis 
conducted a study from 2008 to 2015 in order to ascertain changes in coverage among 
previously incarcerated young men.8 The study concluded that the level of coverage 
improved among this specific population under the ACA but that previously incarcerated 
young men still comprise a significant percentage of the uninsured.9 Similar studies have 
been conducted that focus on other population categories such as race, ethnicity, and even 
the adult population of the state of Georgia.10,11 These studies are relevant to a project 
that examines in part, how the ACA and the VHC exchange that developed under it affect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 John E. McDonough, Inside National Health Reform (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2011). 
8 Tyler N. A. Winkelman, Choi HwaJong, and Matthew M. Davis, "The Affordable Care 
Act, Insurance Coverage, and Health Care Utilization of Previously Incarcerated Young 
Men: 2008-2015," American Journal of Public Health 107, no. 5 (March 2017): pp. 807-
811. 
9 Ibid., 1. 
10 Monica Gentili, Pravara Harati, and Nicoleta Serban, "Projecting the Impact of the 
Affordable Care Act Provisions on Accessibility and Availability of Primary Care 
Providers for the Adult Population in Georgia," American Journal of Public Health 106, 
no. 8 (August 1, 2016): pp. 1470-1476. 
11 Thomas C. Buchmueller, Zachary M. Levinson, Helen G. Levy, Barbara L. Wolfe, 
"Effect of the Affordable Care Act on Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health Insurance 
Coverage," American Journal of Public Health 106, no. 8 (August 1, 2016): pp. 1416-
1421. 
	   9	  
Vermonters as a specific population. The following section details how the third category 
of literature relevant to this thesis discusses the ways that the ACA interacts with state 
exchanges. 
ACA and State Exchanges 
The language of the ACA provides guidelines for how state exchanges should be 
developed and implemented. There is a body of literature that analyzes the implications 
of these novel provisions. Section 1311 of the ACA articulates in statute the requirement 
of states to establish an exchange and outlines the four criteria that these exchanges must 
meet:12 
(Sec. 1311, as modified by Sec. 10104) Requires states to establish an American 
Health Benefit Exchange that: (1) facilitates the purchase of qualified health 
plans; and (2) provides for the establishment of a Small Business Health Options 
Program that is designed to assist qualified small employers in facilitating the 
enrollment of their employees in qualified health plans in the small group market 
in the state. 
 
Requires the Secretary to establish criteria for the certification of health plans as 
qualified health plans, including requirements for: (1) meeting market 
requirements; and (2) ensuring a sufficient choice of providers. 
 
Sets forth the requirements for an Exchange, including that an Exchange: (1) 
must be a governmental agency or nonprofit entity that is established by a state; 
(2) may not make any health plan available that is not a qualified health plan: (3) 
must implement procedures for certification of health plans as qualified health 
plans: and (4) must require health plans seeking certification to submit a 
justification of any premium increase prior to implementation of such increase. 
 
The guidelines put forth in the ACA allow for much discretion in the construction 
of state exchanges. In light of this flexibility, Ericson and Starc present a compelling 
argument about the importance of wise decisions by exchange designers. Their article, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The Staff of The Washington Post, Landmark: the inside story of America's new 
health-care law and what it means for us all (New York: PublicAffairs, 2010), 200-201. 
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entitled “Designing and Regulating Health Insurance Exchanges: Lessons from 
Massachusetts,” asserts that “states have substantial latitude in shaping how exchanges 
operate and the way consumers make decisions . . . yet because exchanges are new, 
exchange designers have been forced to rely on intuition rather than evidence.”13 Paul 
Starr echoes this sentiment about the intricacies of state exchanges by putting them in 
context: “States have long varied sharply in the share of their population without 
insurance. The disparities reflect the states’ economic and demographic characteristics as 
well as their institutions and politics.”14 
Fox and Blanchet relate the task of designing state exchanges under the ACA to 
health care reform efforts in Vermont. The authors discuss the political background of the 
passage of Act 48, through data compiled from 120 interviews with individuals involved 
in the policy’s development.15 They offer praise to Vermont’s handling of the ACA and 
the provisions of Act 48 by writing that “while other states are fighting with the federal 
government over the constitutionality of the ACA and refusing to implement exchanges, 
Vermont has been fighting over how quickly it can do more to go beyond national 
reform.”16 The idea of going beyond national reform is crucial to the development of the 
VHC exchange. The objectives that the policy seeks to carry out aim higher than the 
federally mandated criteria for state exchanges written in the ACA. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Keith M. Marzilli Ericson and Amanda Starc, "Designing and Regulating Health 
Insurance Exchanges: Lessons from Massachusetts," Inquiry 49, no. 4 (December 2012), 
329-330. 
14 Starr, Remedy and Reaction, 163. 
15 Ashley M. Fox and Nathan J. Blanchet, "The Little State That Couldn't Could? The 
Politics Of ‘Single-Payer’ Health Coverage In Vermont," Journal Of Health Politics, 
Policy & Law 40, no. 3 (2015), 478. 
16 Ibid. 
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Health Care Reform in Vermont 
 The State of Vermont is touted as having “a history of pioneering healthcare 
reform.”17 The Vermont Agency of Administration cites that the state began its 
legislative reform efforts in 2006, while some officials assert that Vermont’s history of 
pioneering health care reform actually extends back 25 or 30 years.18,19 In order to 
provide health coverage for children, teens, and pregnant people, Vermont created the Dr. 
Dynasaur program in 1989. In 2006 the state passed the Catamount Health initiative, the 
Vermont Health Access Program (VHAP), and six key health care reform principles 
under Act No. 191. An act relating to health care affordability for Vermonters: 1) 
universal access to coverage and essential health care services; 2) comprehensive and 
continuous health care coverage; 3) a health delivery system that models continuous 
improvement of health care quality and safety; 4) sufficient, equitable, fair, and 
sustainable financing; 5) accountability for quality, cost, access, and participation; and 6) 
the engagement of Vermonters to lead healthy lifestyles with a focus on preventative 
care.20 This legacy of being at the forefront of health care reform helped to propel 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 “Report on the Impact of Expanding Vermont Health Connect to Include Large Group 
Employers” (Green Mountain Care Board, Montpelier, VT, February 11, 2016), 3.  
18 "Making Quality Health Care Available to All Vermonters | Health Care Reform," 
Vermont Agency of Administration, accessed May 1, 2017, http://hcr.vermont.gov/. 
19 Robin Lunge (Director of Health Care Reform, GMCB) in discussion with the author, 
March 1, 2017. 
20 1 V.S.A. § 191. 
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Act 48  
Perhaps the largest health care reform milestone in Vermont came when the 
legislature passed Act 48 in 2011, on the heels of the ACA.21 As an October 2011 piece 
in VTDigger exemplifies, Act 48 was met with substantial political controversy.22 
Proponents of the new law argued that Act 48’s tilt toward a universal health care system 
would streamline coverage, cut costs, and mimic other countries in order to provide better 
quality care.23 Those opposed held concerns that it is unfair to spread the costs associated 
with poor health habits to all residents and that such a system would lead to unsustainable 
costs and budget deficits.24 However, all sides in the debate surrounding Act 48 agreed 
that some reform was necessary due to the fact that the “costs of health care [were] rising 
faster than the economy.”25 
At the time of Act 48’s passage, health care costs in Vermont had been increasing 
at rates of up to 8.5% per year, coverage was failing to improve, and close to 200,000 
(out of a population of approximately 626,000)26 people lacked adequate health 
insurance.27 In response to these circumstances, Act 48 took three primary actions. The 
first was the creation of a regulatory body, the GMCB, tasked with “changing the way we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 “Making Quality Health Care Available to All Vermonters.”  
22 Alan Panebaker, "Health care gurus spar over Act 48," VTDigger, October 21, 2011, 




25 Ibid. 26	  “2011 Vermont Population Estimates” (Vermont Department of Health, Burlington, 
VT, January 2013), 1.	  
27 “Brief Summary of Act 48 Vermont Health Reform Law of 2011,” (Vermont Agency 
of Administration, Montpelier, VT, 2011). 
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pay for health care and controlling growth in health care costs.”28 Second, the legislation 
charged the Secretary of Administration with the job of designing a prospective financing 
plan for a single-payer health care system.29 Lastly, Act 48 established Vermont’s own 
health benefit exchange in accordance with the requirements of federal law as prescribed 
in the ACA. This provision led to the formation of VHC.30 Also of significance, Act 48 
created in statute, the position of the Director of Health Care Reform who is “responsible 
for coordinating health care reform initiatives across state government” and overseeing 
“collaborations for health care reform among executive branch agencies, departments, 
offices, and the Green Mountain Care Board.”31 
Vermont’s Own Exchange 
The provision of Act 48 in which the State of Vermont establishes its own 
exchange separate from the federal exchange represents a deliberate policy choice. When 
asked why Vermont chose to implement a state-based exchange, Robin Lunge, former 
Director of Health Care Reform in the Shumlin administration, called the decision a “no-
brainer.”32 Lunge notes that because Vermont has typically been at the forefront of 
covering Vermonters through Medicaid expansion, prior to the passage of the ACA, the 
state already had coverage for Vermonters whose income was up to 300% of the Federal 
Poverty Level (FPL).33 Thus, under the federal government’s exchange, Vermonters 
would receive less help paying for health care, coupled with higher out-of-pocket costs.34 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Ibid., 1. 
29 Ibid., 1. 
30 Ibid., 1. 
31 “Making Quality Health Care Available to All Vermonters.” 
32 Robin Lunge, March 1, 2017. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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The exchange created under Act 48 allowed the state to implement a state-based premium 
supplement and cost-sharing reduction in addition to assistance provided by the ACA, in 
order for financial assistance in Vermont to basically stay the same.35 Under VHC 
Vermonters are able to benefit from several types of financial assistance including 
Advanced Premium Tax Credits, Vermont Premium Assistance, and other Cost-Sharing 
Reductions (CSR).36 
In 2014, then Governor of Vermont, Peter Shumlin, appointed a Chief of Health 
Care Reform to be his senior advisor on the topic.37 Lawrence Miller, the person drafted 
for this job, also cites concrete reasons for Vermont’s decision to establish a state-based 
exchange. Miller articulates that a state-based exchange would be able to help the state 
maximize the benefits of Medicaid expansion subsidies, maintain the affordability curve 
already in place in the state, and continue Vermont’s generosity in terms of health care 
funding.38 This was to be accomplished through Vermont’s own arrangement of premium 
assistance and cost-sharing measures under the exchange.39 As an additional incentive, 
Vermont received substantial financial support from the federal government to develop 
its own exchange.40 The state was “awarded more than $250 million in federal funding . . 
. the fifth-highest amount among the states, although Vermont has the country’s second-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Ibid. 36	  Lawrence Miller, “Vermont Health Connect Report” (Office of the Governor, 
Montpelier, VT, June 27, 2016), 26.	  
37 John Flowers, "In Profile: Lawrence Miller takes on health care reform," VTDigger, 
April 20, 2014, accessed May 1, 2017, https://vtdigger.org/2014/04/20/profile-lawrence-
miller-goes-leading-states-economic-development-efforts-taking-health-care-reform/. 
38 Lawrence Miller (Chief of Health Care Reform) in discussion with the author, March 
6, 2017. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Grubb, “Lessons from Vermont’s Health Care Reform,” 1277. 
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smallest population,” which meant that “state exchange development [was] 100% 
federally funded.”41 
Assessment of VHC and its Policy Objectives 
Act 48 outlines 14 principles for health care reform that are meant to guide the 
implementation of its legislated reforms.42 While Act 48 takes three primary actions, this 
thesis focuses on the establishment of Vermont’s own health care exchange. The analysis 
identifies the principles of health care reform directly related to the exchange as the main 
policy objectives for VHC. The relevant principles sourced directly from the legislation 
are as follows and are listed with the corresponding numeral from the law itself:43  
(1) The state of Vermont must ensure universal access to and coverage for high-
quality, medically necessary health services for all Vermonters. Systemic barriers, 
such as cost, must not prevent people from accessing necessary health care. All 
Vermonters must receive affordable and appropriate health care at the 
appropriate time in the appropriate setting.  
 (3) The health care system must be transparent in design, efficient in operation, 
and accountable to the people it serves. The state must ensure public 
participation in the design, implementation, evaluation, and accountability 
mechanisms of the health care system.  
 (6) Vermonters should be aware of the costs of the health services they receive. 
Costs should be transparent and easy to understand.  
(7) Individuals have a personal responsibility to maintain their own health and to 
use health resources wisely, and all individuals should have a financial stake in 
the health services they receive.  
 (11) The financing of health care in Vermont must be sufficient, fair, predictable, 
transparent, sustainable, and shared equitably.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Ibid. 
42 1a V.N.A. § 48. 
43 Ibid. 
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 (13) Vermont’s health care system must operate as a partnership between 
consumers, employers, health care professionals, hospitals, and the state and 
federal government.  
The six applicable principles articulated by the legislation, coupled with the 
reasoning discussed above for the deliberate choice to create a state-based exchange in 
Vermont, lead to the formation of three policy objectives for VHC. These objectives can 
be summarized as follows, and are the basis of this assessment of the exchange: 1) VHC 
should function efficiently in order to increase the number of Vermonters covered by 
quality health insurance; 2) the financing structure of the exchange should maximize the 
use of state and federal dollars in order to provide cost-savings to Vermonters; and 3) 
VHC should serve as a tool through which Vermonters can learn about health care 
options and make educated purchasing choices. 
Information Technology Missteps 
 VHC has been widely criticized for its information technology shortcomings and 
blunders. These faults are pertinent to the third principle for health care reform in Act 48 
that requires the health care system to be “efficient in operation,” which corresponds to 
the policy objective that VHC must function efficiently.44 The series of information 
technology problems associated with VHC are important to this analysis, because the 
glitches hampered tens of thousands of consumers from effectively accessing VHC’s 
health care coverage. Since its rollout, VHC has been wrought with technical problems, 
many of which received significant media attention. This section defines the five most 
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prominent information technology issues, and the ways in which VHC has addressed 
them. 
Qualified Special Cases 
Qualified special cases “are cases that are escalated to a dedicated customer 
service team due to their complexity, medical or financial urgency, or inability to be 
resolved through normal channels.”45 Oftentimes this escalation is a consequence of one 
of the other three major errors (renewals processing, service level agreement, or change 
of circumstance), in conjunction with other factors unique to the individual’s situation. 
Subsequent monthly reports written for the General Assembly in order to detail the status 
of VHC indicate that these types of cases are decreasing in instance from previous 
periods.46 For example, over a nine-week period in the spring of 2015, the number of 
pending cases was cut from 115 to 22 and in June 2015 the number of new cases each 
week was the lowest it had been in six months.47 
Renewals Processing 
Most of the types of renewals that the VHC system has had difficulty processing 
include Eligibility/Plan Change Renewals, age-offs, and Program Change Renewals.48 If 
a consumer’s eligibility for a cost-sharing reduction subsidy changed, if he or she aged 
off of the parameters established by his/her current plan, or if the individual needed to 
choose a new plan, making the necessary changes to health coverage in a timely manner 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Ibid., 9. 46	  Ibid.	  47	  “Vermont Health Connect Update on June 2015 Project Development, Operations, and 
Enrollment Data,” (Department of Vermont Health Access, Williston, VT, July 22, 
2015), 14. 
48 “Vermont Health Connect Monthly Report” (Department of Vermont Health Access, 
Williston, VT, May 14 2015), 7. 
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might prove difficult, because processing of these renewals required time-consuming 
manual workarounds. By April 2015, however, VHC claimed to have a handle on this 
particular problem and had completed 89.2% of the backlogged renewals.49 
Service Level Agreement errors - 834 transaction and premium processing errors 
(carrier integration) 
VHC has also had information technology problems with coordinating and 
updating information between its system and the systems of the individual insurance 
carriers. In other words, if a consumer made a change through VHC, the actual insurance 
provider may not have received information regarding the change and it would not be 
reflected in the consumer’s coverage. To remedy this problem, VHC put in place the 
following improved protocol: “within 24 hours of receiving an 834 file from VHC, 
insurance carriers will respond with either a confirmation that coverage has been 
effectuated, a rejection, or a request for more time. This allows VHC to confirm that the 
information in its system and the insurer’s system is aligned.”50 
Change of Circumstance  
The change of circumstance glitch in the VHC system has perhaps received the 
most media and public attention. A monthly report provided to the Vermont General 
Assembly defines what situations generally produce this problem:  
“Some changes, known as ‘qualifying events,’ allow customers to sign up for 
health insurance or change health plans outside of the annual Open Enrollment 
period. Examples of qualifying events include getting married or losing job-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Ibid. 
50 “Vermont Health Connect Update on Project Development, Operations, and 
Enrollment Data” (Department of Vermont Health Access, Williston, VT, August 21, 
2015), 15. 
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sponsored insurance. Other changes, such as income changes can impact the 
amount of financial help a customer receives. Finally, some changes are simply 
adjustments to personal information, such as a name change, an address change, 
or even a preference to be called on their cell phone instead of their home 
phone.”51  
In August 2015, VHC improved the handling of these changes and others (such as 
requested terminations, citizenship status, and pregnancy), so that they could be 
processed immediately over the phone.52 This new functionality of being able to “process 
changes in real-time,” has enabled VHC staff to reduce the bottleneck of circumstance 
requests.53 
Technical Missteps 
The complexities of these electronic problems demonstrate that the basis of the 
fault attributed to VHC is in the technology. These information technology issues lead to 
serious service complications, but they are system errors rather than issues with the health 
care reform policy that VHC represents. The Shumlin administration addressed this at the 
end of his term when it declared that the “technical bugs in the exchange are nearly 
resolved.”54 Comparable health care reform efforts, such as the Massachusetts overhaul 
in 2006, experienced implementation snags as well.55 In the case of Massachusetts, John 
Rother, executive vice president of policy and strategy at AARP noted that the passing of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 “Vermont Health Connect Update on Project Development, Operations, and 
Enrollment Data” (Department of Vermont Health Access, Williston, VT, September 23, 
2015), 11. 
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid. 
54 Hirschfeld, “Scott Says It’s Time to Abandon Vermont Health Connect.” 
55 Alex Wayne and Edward Epstein, "Obama Seals Legislative Legacy With Health 
Insurance Overhaul," CQ Weekly, March 29, 2010, 748-53. 
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legislation was only “10 percent of the accomplishment, and implementing it well was 90 
percent.”56 Rother also purports that “you can have a good piece of legislation that can 
get completely screwed up by mistakes in implementation,” but that is not to say that the 
reform effort is not fundamentally positive.57 It is through this lens that VHC’s 
information technology hurdles must be viewed. The glitches are problematic, but VHC 
has upgraded its system’s functionality in order to correct them and implementation 
obstacles are inevitable, no matter what the policy or reform effort. 
How VHC Achieves Act 48’s Policy Objectives 
 Although the implementation of the VHC health insurance marketplace portal and 
website has faced serious information technology issues, the exchange has had success in 
regard to each of the policy objectives that this paper derives from Act 48’s principles of 
health care reform. The development and implementation of VHC has helped to increase 
the number of Vermonters covered by quality health insurance, the exchange utilizes a 
financing structure that maximizes the use of federal dollars, and VHC does considerable 
community outreach and education so that Vermonters can learn about health care 
options and make educated purchasing choices. In affirming that VHC has fulfilled these 
initial policy goals, it is helpful to examine each objective individually. 
Levels of Health Insurance Coverage 
 The first of VHC’s policy objectives is that the exchange should facilitate growth 
in the number of Vermonters who are covered by health insurance. In this respect, the 
numbers clearly show that VHC is accomplishing this goal. In January 2015, an update 
submitted to the legislature by VHC reported, “Vermont’s uninsured rate was cut nearly 	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in half over the past two years.”58 As of that time, Vermont ranked second in the nation in 
terms of health coverage with 3.7% of the population, or roughly 23,000 people, 
remaining uninsured.59 Vermont also ranks number one in the nation for insuring 
children, “having cut the number of uninsured children in [the] state from nearly 2,800 in 
2012 to fewer than 1,300 in 2014.”60 VHC also reports that significant numbers of 
Vermonters obtain health insurance during the exchange’s annual open enrollment 
periods. For example, from December 2014 to April 2015 (the Open Enrollment period 
was from November 15, 2014 to February 15, 2015), the number of people entering into 
Qualified Health Plans (QHPs) or Medicaid plans for the first time under VHC was more 
than 20,000.61  
The Vermont Household Health Insurance Survey (VHHIS) is the go-to tool for a 
comprehensive assessment of health insurance coverage in Vermont.62 The State of 
Vermont has used the VHHIS in order to measure and track the “health insurance 
coverage status, affordability of insurance and health care services of the Vermont 
population for over a decade,” conducting surveys in 2000, 2005, 2008, 2009, 2012, and 
2014.63 The VHHIS presents the results in terms of both percentages and a count of 
individuals. This is important to note because the number of respondents varies with each 
VHHIS. For example, in the 2009 survey, roughly 1,000 more Vermont households were 
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surveyed than for the 2014 survey.64 VHC typically reports its enrollment in numbers 
rather than percentages, so the count data does offer a useful comparison. The VHHIS 
results are also an example of descriptive statistics, the findings reduce all of the 
variables that effect health care in Vermont to simple numbers. As such, there are limits 
to the conclusions that can be drawn from these numbers because it is plausible that 
factors other than VHC could be affecting the observed changes. VHC did begin 
operation in October 2013,65 so the results of the most recent VHHIS survey, conducted 
in 2014, could be demonstrative the exchange’s effects. Changes in the survey results 
from 2012 to 2014 particularly, support VHC’s claim that it is continually helping to 
insure more Vermonters. 
Figure 1 shows that Vermont’s uninsured rate of 3.7% in 2014 represents a 
“significant decrease from the percentage without coverage observed in 2012.”66 The 
2014 survey found that 22,231 Vermonters were uninsured, compared to 47,460 in 2009 
and 42,760 in 2012, with a much smaller reduction in the 2009-2012 period.67 Figure 2, 
comparing the rate of uninsured children with the child poverty rate over time, illustrates 
VHC’s effectiveness in insuring Vermont children. It shows a steady decline in the 
uninsured rate, independent of the child poverty rate. The VHHIS discovered that “only 
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1.0% (approximately 1,300) of children aged 0 to 17 lacked health insurance coverage in 
2014 compared to 2.5% in 2012.”68 
 
Figure 1 - The Uninsured Rate in Vermont69 
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Figure 2 - Rate of VT Child Poverty vs. Rate of VT Children Uninsured (Data Source: 2005, 
2008, 2009, 2012, and 2014 VHHIS) 70 
	  
The 2014 VHHIS noted decreases in not only the uninsured rates among 
Vermont’s children, but for all other resident age categories as well. Table 1 presents the 
percentage of uninsured persons in the state of Vermont. Table 2 shows the number of 
uninsured persons counted in the survey. Although the 2014 survey shows that 
Vermonters aged 25 to 34 “had the highest uninsured rate at 11.0% (7,936),” this number 
declined significantly from the 2012 survey’s findings of 18.2% (12,848).71 Another 
particularly noteworthy decrease in the uninsured rate appears among those aged 18 to 
24. The uninsured rate dropped from 11.5% (9,341) in 2012 to 4.6% (2,920) in 2014.72 	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Table 1 - Uninsured Rates in Vermont by Age73 
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Table 2 - Number of Persons Uninsured by Age (Data Source: 2005, 2008, 2009, 2012, and 
2014 VHHIS) 74 
	  	   As a result of the implementation of VHC and provisions spelled out in the ACA, 
a greater number of Vermonters are eligible for coverage and subsidies to help offset the 
costs of health insurance. Due to the ACA and Vermont’s acceptance of its Medicaid 
expansion provisions, Vermont residents with “an annual income of less than 139% of 
Federal Poverty Level (FPL) were eligible for coverage through Medicaid beginning in 
2014.”75 Prior to the ACA’s passage, Vermont provided coverage through its Dr. 
Dynasaur program for children whose annual household income was less than 317% of 
the FPL.76 For Vermont residents not covered by Medicaid or Dr. Dynasaur, but with 
annual incomes of less than 400% of the FPL, subsidies are offered to help with the 	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purchasing of insurance through VHC.77 Table 3 illustrates how this expanded eligibility 
for coverage and subsidies has led to increased levels of coverage for those with incomes 
across all levels with respect to the FPL. Table 4 shows this change in terms of survey 
count. 
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Table 4 - Number of Persons Uninsured by Income Relative to FPL79 
	  
Another key finding of the VHHIS relevant to levels of health insurance coverage 
in Vermont is that the cost of coverage remains a “primary barrier” for the uninsured to 
obtain coverage. The survey reports that nearly half of respondents specified that “the 
cost of health insurance was the only reason they currently lacked coverage.”80 Table 5 
indicates that this perception about the cost of health coverage is improving over time, 
with the number of such responses having decreased since 2009. With the 
implementation of VHC in October 2013, the percent of uninsured persons that 
designated cost as a major factor deterring them from obtaining coverage decreased from 
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72.3% to 65.6% from 2012 to 2014. VHC aims to make health insurance more affordable 
for Vermonters through various types of financial assistance. 
 
Table 5 - Reasoning for Lack of Coverage (Data Source: 2009, 2012, and 2014 VHHIS) 81 
	  	   The results of the 2014 VHHIS indicate that levels of health insurance coverage 
have increased among Vermonters in measurable and significant ways since the 
implementation of VHC. The overall uninsured rate was nearly cut in half from 2012 to 
2014, substantial progress has been made in providing coverage to all of Vermont’s 
children, expanded subsidies and eligibility requirements have helped more people obtain 
coverage at all income levels, and fewer people view cost as an inhibiting factor to 
getting health insurance. In addition to these survey results, VHC reports significant 
increases in the number of individuals covered by QHPs and Medicaid after each Open 	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Enrollment period (an increase of 10,000 from December 2014 to April 2015).82 These 
facts support the assessment that VHC has met the policy objective that it must increase 
the number of Vermonters covered by health insurance.	   	  
Maximization of Federal and State Funds 
 VHC’s second policy goal as derived from Act 48 and the decision to create a 
state-sponsored exchange is that its reforms should help to maximize the receipt of 
federal funds in order to be able to pass on cost-savings to Vermonters. In a 2013 article 
for the New England Journal of Medicine, Dr. Laura K. Grubb, MD, MPH, praises 
policymakers in Vermont for doing just that. Grubb maintains that other states can learn 
lessons from Vermont and the state’s handling of reform under the ACA. In terms of 
VHC she writes: “The development of a health insurance exchange presents opportunities 
for state-specific health care innovation . . . states may capitalize on federal financing 
opportunities to build new state health programs and realize cost savings.”83 Vermont’s 
Medicaid expansion project is another example of a savvy harnessing of federal funds to 
maximize benefits for Vermonters.84 Grubb notes that Vermont received $249 million in 
federal financing for the expansion of a Medicaid program that stretches far beyond the 
federal eligibility mark and will save the state 10.9% in expenditures; this is in contrast to 
states that did not expand their Medicaid programs.85 
 The exchange also helps to pass cost-savings attributed to the use of federal funds 
on to non-Medicaid recipients. Of VHC customers covered by private QHPs in 2015, 
three out of five (63%) qualified for the federal Advanced Premium Tax Credit (APTC), 	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which is in addition to the more than half of customers who received Vermont Premium 
Assistance (VPA) and other cost-sharing reductions (CSR).86 Policyholders can choose to 
apply the APTC to their monthly premiums or to receive the credit annually upon the 
filing of federal income taxes. (Eligibility for the APTC usually extends to individuals 
with an annual income of less than $47,520 and families with an income of less than 
$97,200.87,88) Moreover, many Vermonters receiving financial help to lower the cost of 
health insurance find that their monthly premium bills are not increasing because when 
health plan costs rise, the amount of financial help increases as well.89  
 The federal tax credit operates in conjunction with the state financial help 
resulting in a real effect on the out of pocket costs for the various QHPs in the exchange. 
An example of this is offered in regular reports provided to the Vermont General 
Assembly on behalf of VHC:90 
The typical (median) individual receiving CSR is enrolled in a Standard Silver 87 
plan with a $600 medical deductible and $1,250 maximum out-of-pocket. This 
individual also receives $362 in premium assistance. If she purchased a Standard 
Silver plan with a full-cost of $466, it would cost her $104 per month. 
 
Figure 3 shows a graphic representation of how financial help is distributed to 
Vermonters and the types of plans that those receiving aid are able to choose under VHC. 
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Figure 3 - Financial Help Information Graphic91 
	  
 
It is important to note that there are four levels of CSR that are determined by 
household income relative to the FPL and that “Vermonters with lower incomes qualify 
for CSR levels that offer steeper reductions in out-of-pocket costs.”92 VHC calculates that 
“Vermonters who qualify for the two less generous levels of CSR could conceivably have 
a lower total cost in a Gold or Platinum plan,” while those “who qualify for the two most 
generous levels of CSR can expect a lower total cost in a Silver plan.”93 Many of the plan 
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designs and rates for 2016 were similar to those that have been offered in the past, with 
only minor changes to “some deductibles, maximum out-of-pockets, and cost-sharing 
requirements,” so that a similar situation where lower-income Vermonters are able to 
purchase higher metal plans can be predicted for upcoming years.94 It is evident that the 
financial help offered to Vermonters through VHC in the form of federal funds and other 
cost-sharing mechanisms helps to ease the health insurance financial burden for 
Vermonters and often allows them to purchase a higher metal plan, therefore increasing 
their benefits. 
Consumer Outreach and Education 
The exchange’s third policy objective is to serve as a tool through which 
Vermonters can learn about health care options and make educated purchasing choices. 
VHC orchestrates a number of efforts to ensure that those who need help with coverage 
the most have access to the resources that they need to maximize their benefits. In May 
2015, VHC reported that it has “continued to engage CSR-eligible customers, especially 
those who qualify for the most generous CSR levels (Silver 87 and Silver 94), to make 
sure they understand how cost-sharing reductions work and what they mean for their total 
health care costs.”95 In order to educate Vermonters about the exchange, VHC also offers 
“Health Insurance 101” information sessions across the state, ahead of each Open 
Enrollment period.96 These are free, public, events, often held at local libraries and 
pharmacies with the goal of helping customers “better understand health insurance terms, 
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financial help, and the Vermont Health Connect system,” so that they are able to “choose 
the right health plan for their needs and budget.”97  
VHC undertakes additional outreach efforts ahead of each annual Open 
Enrollment period. The VHC Assister Program coordinates Navigators, Certified 
Application Counselors, and Brokers during this high-traffic period. This team of 
Assisters helps to “ensure that Vermonters in every corner of the state have access to in-
person assistance if they need help understanding health insurance or signing up for a 
plan.”98 For example, in September 2015, VHC conducted 993 consultations, or 
consumer interactions of at least 10 minutes duration.99 In October of the same year, the 
exchange reported 535 consultations.100 In order to prepare for the Open Enrollment 
period, VHC also distributes “promotional and educational materials” to its “customer-
facing partners.”101 This distribution includes “mailings to restaurants and radios, print, 
and online ads to ensure that Vermonters know the implications of not signing up for 
insurance.”102 The content of these materials focuses not only on the “benefits of health 
coverage,” but also on the “fact that the federal Shared Responsibility Provision fee for 
not having coverage increases” each year.103 In 2016, the cost of this provision was 
$695.00 per adult, or 2.5% of household income, dependent upon whichever amount is 
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greater.104 This kind of community engagement and outreach on the topic of health 
insurance options was not available prior to the implementation of the exchange, and so 
the fact that there are educational efforts at all under VHC constitutes fulfillment of the 
third policy objective. 
VHC’s Current Prospects 
A Question for Vermont  
Six years after the passage of Act 48 and four since VHC’s first Open Enrollment 
period, the exchange is still a controversial topic in Vermont. The question at hand in 
2017 is whether or not Vermont should keep the VHC exchange or abandon it for a new 
system. The state’s newly elected governor, Phil Scott, campaigned with the message that 
Vermonters pay high rates for a system that fails to function properly.105 Scott advocated 
that Vermont should switch to either “the federal exchange or a state partnership 
model.”106 The Governor maintains that his “administration is set to examine a number of 
proposals that are designed to improve the reliability” of VHC, although as of March 29, 
2017, he was not issuing any details about these alternatives.107,108 Scott’s budget 
proposals indicate that he foresees a degree of cost-savings resulting from the 
encouragement of VHC’s commercial customers to purchase insurance directly from 	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carriers as well as from transferring some of VHC’s contracted services to the Agency of 
Human Services.109 
 In December 2016, Strategic Solutions Group, LLC, published a 121-page report 
commissioned by the Vermont General Assembly, “Recommendations for the Future of 
the Vermont Health Benefit Exchange.”110 This report evaluates VHC’s operational 
readiness, feasibility, and cost effectiveness.111 It then assesses alternatives to the 
exchange.112 In terms of operational readiness, the report finds that VHC’s current system 
works for those under both QHPs and Medicaid, although technical deficiencies exist in 
the system so that it does not meet all “service level expectations.”113 The report also 
notes “many other states have faced similar challenges with the system implementation 
and operational support,” and that “building on the current VHC system is the most 
feasibly and cost-effective technology option to achieve long-term sustainability.”114,115 
Strategic Solutions examined six alternative solutions to the VHC system including the 
federal exchange and partnerships with other states, but found that they either “do not 
support the unique Vermont health benefits policy, or introduce excessive costs or 
risks.”116 The report’s finding that the state should retain VHC appears to undermine 
Governor Scott’s proposals; however, his Secretary of Human Services, Al Gobeille, 
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points out that Strategic Solutions represents a potential conflict of interest because it is a 
company that is often hired to fix broken exchanges.117 
 An additional facet of VHC’s current prospects is whether or not, if Vermont 
keeps the exchange, it should be expanded to include more groups of Vermonters. Under 
the current version of the exchange, “all individual and small group employees and their 
families are treated as a single risk pool across the state,” in which they purchase 
coverage through VHC.118 Through the passage of Act No. 54 in 2015, the legislature 
tasked the GMCB with assessing the impact on insurance rates if groups such as 
employees of companies with over 100 employees, or government employees, were 
allowed to purchase coverage on the exchange.119 The GMCB hired Lewis and Ellis, Inc. 
to analyze this impact and their report finds that “allowing large employers to enter VHC 
will produce higher premiums on average in the large group market,” and “that more 
Vermonters, including small group employers and individual policyholders, would be 
negatively impacted than positively impacted.”120 
VHC and the Trump Administration 
 
The central tenet of President Trump’s health care reform initiative is a “three-
pronged approach to repeal and replace,” the ACA.121 In his first 100 days in office, 
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Trump supported the American Health Care Act (AHCA), a piece of legislation that 
would eliminate the ACA and put in its place a system that expands Health Savings 
Accounts and high-risk pools, allows insurance to be purchased across state lines, 
encourages full-year enrollment and less restrictive insurance plans under the exchanges, 
and would reduce prescription drug costs by changing the Food and Drug 
Administration’s approval process.122  
The AHCA had a 17% approval rating and did not even come up for a vote in the 
House of Representatives because it would have taken insurance away from millions of 
Americans.123 Yet, in April 2017, Representative Tom MacArthur of New Jersey 
proposed a similar plan.124 These plans are not only criticized across at the federal level, 
they also have tangible consequences for Vermont’s exchange. 
 Under VHC, Vermonters are offered financial help in multiple ways as a result of 
ACA provisions. Individuals and families with annual incomes that fall between 100% 
and 400% of the FPL are eligible for refundable premium tax credits when they purchase 
health insurance coverage through the state marketplace.125 The AHCA also proposes 
refundable tax credits, but eligibility would vary only with age and annual inflation, 
rather than in addition to income and regional cost of insurance.126 For example, under 
the ACA’s approach the tax credits are more generous for lower incomes and those with 	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an income over 400% of the FPL do not receive a credit, whereas under the AHCA the 
tax credit “is flat for incomes up to $75,000 for an individual and $150,000 for a married 
couple, and so would provide relatively more assistance to people with upper-middle 
incomes.”127 These differing eligibility approaches have significant effects on the cost of 
insurance for those who rely on financial assistance to make health insurance more 
affordable. 
 Of particular importance to the VHC exchange, those who would receive less 
financial assistance under the AHCA, as a result of its tax credit approach, are the 
“people who are older, lower-income, or live in high-premium areas.”128 Vermont checks 
off all of these boxes. In fact, an interactive map created by the Kaiser Family Foundation 
predicts that under the AHCA, Vermonters in each of the state’s 13 counties would see a 
large increase in premiums paid after tax credits and would also spend a greater 
percentage of their income on health insurance.129 Figure 4 predicts the way in which the 
replacement proposals under the Trump administration might affect health insurance tax 
credits by income and geography in the year 2020 for a 40-year-old individual. Figure 5 
shows the predicted effects on a family of four. Vermont is a high-cost premium area. 
The AHCA provides more generous tax credits to middle and higher income individuals 
and families, while the ACA provides dramatically higher tax credits for lower income 
individuals and families. 
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Figure 4 - Health Insurance Tax Credits, 40-year-old individual130 
	  
Figure 5 - Health Insurance Tax Credits, family of four131 
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One of the primary policy objectives of VHC is to maximize the use of federal 
and state funds in order to pass along cost-savings benefits to Vermonters. The AHCA 
replacement proposal would make it more difficult for the VHC exchange to fulfill this 
objective because Vermonters, especially those with lower incomes, would see less 
financial assistance in the form of refundable tax credits. This in turn, would make 
Vermont health insurance premiums more expensive and less accessible for the most 
vulnerable populations. 
Conclusion 
 On the heels of the ACA’s passage in 2010, the State of Vermont decided to take 
the opportunity to develop and implement its own state-based insurance marketplace 
portal, VHC. This decision was established through actions taken in Act 48 of 2011, 
because Vermont had already extended coverage beyond federal requirements prior to the 
ACA. This paper articulated that VHC is associated with three distinct policy objectives: 
1) VHC should function efficiently in order to increase the number of Vermonters 
covered by quality health insurance;  
2) The financing structure of the exchange should maximize the use of state and 
federal dollars in order to provide cost-savings to Vermonters; and  
3) VHC should serve as a tool through which Vermonters can learn about health 
care options and make educated purchasing choices. 
Although a series of information technology problems has affected the system’s 
functionality, VHC is continually working to improve and remedy these faults, a caveat 
that is nearly unavoidable in terms of policy implementation. In contrast to this 
component of VHC, the analysis in this paper shows that the exchange has met all of the 
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remaining policy objectives; Vermont has seen declines in its overall uninsured rate, in 
the uninsured rate among children, and in the uninsured rate across all categories of the 
FPL. The exchange also utilizes state and federal funds in order to provide various forms 
of financial assistance to Vermonters so that they can purchase a higher metal QHP, and 
carries out community outreach and education efforts in several forms.  
 VHC’s presence in Vermont is still quite controversial. The new gubernatorial 
administration is seeking to abandon the exchange for a new system, despite the finding 
of the Strategic Solutions study that the most cost-effective way of handling VHC at this 
point in time is to build upon the current, fundamentally strong, technological platform 
and that each of the six proposed alternatives to the exchange posed both policy and 
financial risks. The results of this analysis support Strategic Solutions’ ultimate finding. 
VHC, in its current state, is meeting the policy objectives laid out for it in Act 48 and the 
initial decision to establish a state-based exchange. This result, along with the finding that 
the exchange’s technology needs improvement, but has a solid foundation, makes a case 
for the state to maintain VHC. There are some stipulations. As discussed in this paper, the 
exchange should not expand to include large group employers, because this would 
contribute to premium increases. VHC should also continue to address the information 
technology problems that hamper its functionality. Finally, in a broad effort to contain 
health care costs in Vermont and thus aid in the effectiveness of the exchange, the state 
should move forward with its initiative to encompass different populations under the all-
payer model (see Appendix 2) in order to assess the feasibility of such a policy. 
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Appendix 1 – Informational Interviews 
 
 For this research project I conducted three informational interviews with leaders 
in health care reform policy work in the State of Vermont. Conversations lasted from 30-
90 minutes. Two out of the three interviews were held over the phone and one took place 
in person. The citations used in the text of this thesis are sourced from audio recordings 
of the phone interviews and my own handwritten notes taken during the in person 
interview. The interviewees included:  
• Michael Costa, who served as the Deputy Director of Health Care Reform under 
Governor Shumlin, and serves as the Deputy Commissioner of Health Services 
and Managed Care at the Department of Vermont Health Access in the Scott 
administration.  
 
• Robin Lunge, Director of Health Care Reform under Governor Shumlin and 
current member of the GMCB. 
 
• Lawrence Miller, Chief of Health Care Reform in the Shumlin administration. 
 
I obtained permission to conduct these interviews from the University of Vermont’s 
Institutional Review Board in the Research Protections Office. My project was granted an 
Exemption under Category 2 with the following parameters:  
"Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, 
achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures, or observation of public 
behavior, unless: (a) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human 
subjects can be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (b) 
any disclosure of the human subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably 
place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' 
financial standing, employability, or reputation." 
 
Interviewees were provided with the information below in the form of an 
electronic handout prior to the scheduled interview. This material outlined the purpose of 
my research and advised the interviewees of their rights as participants in the project. 
 
	   45	  
Introduction 
You are being invited to take part in this research study because you have been identified 
as an expert in the field of health care policy in Vermont. This study is being conducted 
by Ashlynn Doyon, a student at the University of Vermont, writing an Honors Thesis to 
be completed for May 2017. 
 
Purpose  
A summary of this research project is as follows: The implementation of Vermont’s state 
health exchange has been at the forefront of political debate since the passage of the 
Green Mountain Care Act in 2011. Despite the fact that Vermont Health Connect faces 
criticisms, little in the way of academic evaluation has been written. This is a critical 
issue as it affects the livelihood of Vermonters and will likely be subject to greater 
confusion in the wake of the 2016 election.  This paper will analyze whether the 




This Honors Thesis project seeks to determine whether or not the policy objectives of 
Vermont’s State Healthcare Exchange have been fulfilled. I have approached the project 
by first assessing the policy objectives and goals of implementing Vermont Health 
Connect in Vermont, followed by an assessment of whether or not those initial goals and 
objectives have been met, and am also seeking to offer ideas about how these goals might 
be met in the future. In doing so, I have used several types of materials including the 
Affordable Care Act legislation itself, journals of the Vermont House and Senate, 
Legislative Reports, and information sourced from the National Conference of State 
Legislatures. In order to make such an analysis I plan to have informational interviews 
with people working in the field. In the interviews I will ask the following prescribed 
questions, as well as any relevant follow-up questions based on the responses received: 
 
What do you think were the objectives for the establishment of Vermont’s own healthcare 
exchange? 
 
What aspects of exchange and/or Vermont Health Connect are considered to be 
successes? 
 
In your opinion, are there ways in which the exchange has failed? 
 
Given your response to the objectives question above, do you think that the exchange has 
fulfilled that original policy intent? 
 
What changes do you expect to be made to the exchange in the coming year? 
 
How do you think Vermont Health Connect can be improved? 
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The respondent may choose which questions to answer and in what capacity. Participants 
will be made fully aware of the research project and that answers given will be used for 
the project’s analysis. They will also be identified in order to demonstrate the credibility 
of their responses based on their professional standing and will be notified of this as well, 
before and during the interview. Interviews might last between 15 and 45 minutes 
depending on the availability of the respondents to participate. 
 
Costs  
There will be no costs to you for participation in this research study. 
 
Compensation  
You will not be paid for taking part in this study. 
 
Confidentiality 
All information collected about you during the course of this study will be stored 
with your name as an identifier so that we are able to match you to your own 
answers. Your responses will not be confidential unless you decide to withdraw or 
change your mind later about your participation in this research. See sections on 
Study Procedures and Voluntary Participation/Withdrawal.  
 
Records of the informational interviews will be kept for the duration of my research 
project to be completed in May of 2017. The final product may or may not be 
published on the University of Vermont’s Honors College website. During the 
research period, records of the interview may be accessed by Ashlynn Doyon, or by 
Professor Eileen Burgin in the Department of Political Science. 
 
Voluntary Participation/Withdrawal  
Taking part in this study is voluntary.  You are free to not answer any questions or to 
withdraw at any time. You may choose not to take part in this study, or if you decide 
to take part, you can change your mind later and withdraw from the study. If you 
choose to withdraw from the study early, the record of your interview will be 
destroyed and will not be used in the research analysis. 
 
Questions 
If you have any questions about this study now or in the future, you may contact me, 
Ashlynn Doyon, at the following phone number: (802)-793-7712. If you have 
questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, then you may 
contact the Director of the Research Protections Office at (802) 656-5040.  
 
Participation 
Your participation is voluntary, and you may refuse to participate without penalty or 
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Appendix 2 – Outcomes of Act 48 
 The development and implementation of VHC is not the only health care reform 
action put forth in Act 48. The other outlined provisions include the creation of a 
prospective financing plan to fund a single-payer health care system in Vermont and the 
development of a means to contain costs and improve the quality of care. Since the law’s 
passage in 2011, there have been developments with respect to these provisions. It is 
helpful to understand the advances in Vermont’s health care reform arena that have taken 
place over the past six years as context for an analysis of VHC. 
Financing a Single-Payer Health Care System 
The attempt to finance a single-payer health care system in Vermont failed. 
Michael Costa served as the Deputy Director of Health Care Reform under Governor 
Shumlin, with the primary task of trying to devise a way to fund a single-payer health 
care system.132 This effort was in response to both the governor’s “lofty” ambitions for 
health care reform as well as a component of Act 48.133 A single-payer system is one in 
which everyone is insured in a publicly financed way; it is paid for through taxes rather 
than private or employer payment.134 A single-payer system has less to do with health 
care delivery and more to do with coverage and how you pay for that coverage.135  
Costa asserts that the funding of single-payer health care was an issue at the 
“intersection of health care and taxation in the state budget process,” in more specific 
terms, this meant that he needed to find a way to take the money that consumers currently 
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pay for health care through employer-sponsored insurance, copayments, coinsurance, and 
qualified health plans, and put it into an “equitable public financing mechanism.”136 
Other teams of policymakers worked on the logistics of things such as the benefits 
package or population rules under this theoretical system, but Costa sought to answer the 
question of how to pay for it.137 One of the most complicated aspects of this effort was 
the attempt to create a financing system that would maximize federal contributions. For 
example, employer-sponsored health plans constitute a large federal tax break for those 
enrolled; when you convert a tax-free benefit you then have to find a way to preserve the 
value of that federal tax incentive.138  
Governor Shumlin rejected the financing proposal that Costa came up with, due to 
his analysis that at that point in time, single-payer was not feasible for Vermont.139 The 
experience led Costa to conclude that if universal coverage is the goal under a single-
payer system, then financing is the wrong thing to focus on.140 He notes that as a result of 
the process he found that there are two conditions that must be met before a publically 
financed system has the opportunity to be successful. First, cost containment must be 
under control because it would be disastrous to convert health care to a tax-based system 
while premiums are still rising and health care spending is surpassing economic 
growth.141 Second, Medicaid must be properly funded; contributions need to increase in 
order to adequately cover costs.142 Costa claims that the administration needed more time 
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to examine the modeling and implications of financing single-payer than the deadlines 
allowed, because health care financing is so complicated.143 Policymakers can take the 
lessons learned from the Shumlin administration’s failed efforts at devising a way to 
finance single-payer and apply them to an analysis of Vermont’s current situation.  
The All-Payer Model 
The first listed provision of Act 48 was the creation of the GMCB, set to control 
costs and improve health care for Vermonters.144 Many of the GMCB’s efforts came to 
fruition in 2016 when “continued negotiations between Vermont and the federal 
government [culminated] in a draft agreement in September 2016 and a signed agreement 
in October 2016.”145 This document was the Vermont All-Payer Accountable Care 
Organization Model Agreement, signed by Governor Shumlin, the Secretary of Human 
Services, the Chair of the GMCB, and the federal government.146 The All-Payer Model is 
fundamentally different than the like-named single-payer model. It focuses on the way 
that hospitals and doctors are paid.147 In laymen’s terms, the concept is as follows: In the 
current system, health care providers typically receive different types of payments from 
every different payer for the patients that they see in Vermont. This fee-for-service 
system provides an incentive for providers to simply do more, which increases costs. An 
all-payer model is a value-based purchasing system. It instead pays providers for the 
quality of outcome of their service, with the idea behind the model that this type of 
system might lower costs and improve health care outcomes overall.  	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145 “Vermont Health Care Innovation Project Quarterly Report” (Agency of 
Administration, Montpelier, VT, November 7, 2016), 3. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Lunge, March 1, 2017. 
	   50	  
This all-payer agreement allows Vermont to pursue the kind of accountable care 
organization structure that the federal government has already been pursuing with 
Medicare.148 The goal is that this model will not only help to control cost growth, but will 
also improve the overall health of Vermonters by increasing access to primary and 
preventive care and improving outcomes in the categories of substance abuse, mental 
health, and chronic disease.149 The Scott administration is continuing the progress begun 
by the former Governor in this regard. In February 2017, Scott announced that Vermont 
is working with an accountable care organization called OneCare to bring 30,000 
Medicaid patients under an all-payer system.150 Governor Scott stated that this contract is 
“a ‘pilot’ that will allow his new administration to decide whether to move forward with 
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